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Drawing upon Stanley Cavell’s concept of the comedy of remarriage and Alain Badiou’s event 
theory, this essay argues that, in James Joyce’s Ulysses, Molly Bloom’s love-event is necessarily 
missed the first time, but it is reasserted in a final repetition, after the initial misrecognition of 
infidelity. 
 
In Molly Bloom’s monologue of James Joyce’s Ulysses we see the fullest expression of an 
affirmative, “Yes,” a utopian opening onto the potentiality of a radically new future, one unbound and 
undetermined. My treatment of this form of utopianism relies on what might appear unusual or 
surprising to many readers—a form of the heuristic genre the philosopher and film critic Stanley 
Cavell names the comedy of remarriage. As Slavoj Žižek argues in In Defense of Lost Causes, for 
Hollywood at least, the family drama is the fundamental venue for reaching the utopian possibilities 
of our historical experience (52). Phillip Wegner has capitalised on the connection between “yes-
saying” remarriage comedies and their utopianism in his discussion of films such as Notting Hill, 
Groundhog Day and Stalker. Starting from the classic structure of the remarriage comedy as a 
struggle for reciprocity and equality between man and woman, Wegner puts pressure on the series of 
crises in these love relationships to point toward the utopian significance of the films (Life Between 
Two Deaths 31). In Stalker, he argues for a link between faith and the possibility of a utopian 
transformation of the world. The ideal locus for the authentic act of the leap of faith is marriage—the 
last signpost of affirmation of faith in a world devoid of hope. The woman’s role is to enact this 
affirmation through her reiterated “yes!”. In this essay I employ Cavell’s concept of the comedy of 
remarriage and Badiou’s concept of the event to argue that Molly’s monologue from the “Penelope” 
section in Ulysses is a comedy of remarriage that seeks to get in touch with the love-event through the 
same affirmation and repetition of yes-saying.   
Badiou’s theory of the event is based on four categories that can generate potential events: 
science, politics, art, and love. For Badiou, the love-event is a radical interruption of the status quo. In 
fact, love is the mode through which the new enters a world delineated by two disjunctive positions: 
that of man and woman. Because these two irreconcilable positions cannot be mediated by a third, 
which would in some way neutralise the differences, Badiou maintains that the situation must be 
supplemented not by a third position, but by a singular event. This event is the amorous encounter 
that serves as the aporetic space that retrospectively links the two irreducible positions. What emerges 
is not the annihilation of the difference, but a truth that transcends it. The impact of the love-event 
shatters the stability of the status quo and results in the systematic breakdown of all previously 
recognisable representations. The void opened by this interruption marks the potential for a new truth 
that proceeds, however, through a repetitive cycle marked by hesitation, aporia, and indecision. 





However, it is this commitment to hesitation and indecision that opens a path for the new. Neither 
stasis nor a full-blown new world, the situation enacted by the event is an in-between state that 
persists in tracking down, and maintaining fidelity to, this event.   
The event in Badiou’s definition consists of a commitment to something momentous found 
through a chance encounter. It is marked by a fidelity to something that is hard to explain in words 
that others will understand.  According to Badiou, “It will therefore always be doubtful that an event 
has taken place, except for the one who intervenes, who decides on its belonging to the situation” 
(Being and Event 229). The event takes place amid confusion and obscurity, and clarity is the result of 
repetition (as in remarriage). As Peter Hallward notes, “It is not that the event itself is nothing. It has 
the same (inconsistent) being-as-being as anything else. An event can be only a multiple, but it is one 
that counts as nothing in the situation in which it takes place” (115).  
Badiou’s category of the love-event either has been disputed or seen as an umbrella category 
that could accommodate any of the domains falling outside of the political, artistic or scientific—such 
as psychoanalysis, theology, and philosophy. It can be further categorised, Žižek holds, through the 
responses it elicits: fidelity, which leads to normalisation and integration through marriage; ; rejection 
of sexual love leading to abstinence;; and, finally, a resurrection of the initial love, leading to the 
remarriage  (In Defense 387). I place the relationship between Molly and Bloom on a continuum of 
fidelity, rejection (in its two guises—libertinage, for Molly, and abstinence, for Bloom), and 
remarriage, with the focus of this essay falling on the latter. Thus, according to Badiou, the event is 
necessarily missed the first time, and fidelity only becomes possible through repetition, as 
resurrection. I argue that Molly’s end of the monologue is the true event of her remarriage to Bloom, 
just as Cavell writes that “the validity of  marriage takes a willingness for repetition” (Pursuits of 
Happiness 126).  
Because the event belongs to the situation, it is undecidable and unpresentable from within 
the situation. Only subjective intervention decides if the event belongs to the situation or not. The 
event reveals the void of a situation and names it as a truth-event. When an event erupts for the first 
time, it is perceived as so traumatic that its significance is missed. In The Sublime Object of Ideology 
Žižek talks about the event asserting itself through repetition after a process of misrecognition—the 
initial failure of opinion to recognise the true character of the event (61). Through repetition, the event 
is recognised and placed in its symbolic network. Originally mistaken for contingency, the event 
realises itself through misrecognition. This is the case with Molly’s marriage to Bloom—her event—in 
relation to her simulacrum affair with Blazes Boylan. The latter has been read by critics as either an 
act of defiance and insubordination or self-affirmation and empowerment. Insofar as it occupies a 
locus of repetition—a stand-in for her now paralyzed lovemaking to Bloom—this affair marks the 
aporetic space between Molly and Bloom. Akin to a form of hysteria, her affair with Blazes restores 
Molly to the patriarchal authority against which she rebels, but also rends the fabric of marital status 
quo enough to place the two spouses in an event-generative crisis.  





Molly’s experience of love as truth-event encompasses both the Lacanian and the Badouian 
approach to truth: the latter when she met Bloom, and the former during her “remarriage,” a comedic 
reversal of Lacan’s concept of the two deaths, as I will show later: “While, for Lacan, Truth is this 
shattering experience of the Void—a sudden insight into the abyss of Being, ‘not a process so much as 
a brief traumatic encounter, or illuminating shock, in the midst of common reality’—, for Badiou, 
Truth is what comes afterward: the long arduous work of fidelity, of enforcing a new law onto the 
situation” (Žižek, For They Know Not What They Do“  lxxxii). Paradoxically, the lover feels inclined to 
betray the event. On one level, Molly’s betrayal of Bloom, her first love, culminates in the adulterous 
tryst with Blazes. On another, Boylan himself functions as a double for a younger Bloom in a fantastic 
recreation of Molly’s youthful pleasures in Gibraltar. The pleasure Molly takes in her encounter with 
Boylan does not liberate, but rather reengages her, in a remarriage to Bloom. Betrayal and repetition 
go hand in hand. Far from simply overcoming her past attachment to Bloom, Molly’s comparisons 
between Bloom and Boylan indicate her identification with a past that preserves the marital pleasures 
that have become self-defining for Molly, even as they are carried into extra-marital relationships. 
What Joyce thematises in Molly’s monologue is “the possibility for the subject of not 
reproducing its subjectivization, but instead, of producing itself anew” (Ensslin 11). Wegner describes 
this space as “a moment of ‘sublime beauty,’ of openness and instability, of experimentation and 
opportunity, of conflict and insecurity—a place, in other words, wherein history might move in a 
number of very different directions” (29). As a remarriage comedy ending in a repetitive “yes,” Molly’s 
monologue is the comedic counterpart of Lacan’s space of the undead. Her erotic fantasy, transposed 
into reality, places her into an endlessly repetitive cycle of erotic memories, some consummated, some 
purely fantastical.  
The undead end up caught in a cycle of pain and guilt, which begins to change when one 
“shifts his perspective and comes to view his existence outside of history proper as a tremendous 
opportunity, both for self-remaking, developing new talents and becoming another kind of subject 
altogether, and to experiment in the creation of community and new truly human relationships” 
(Wegner 32). Molly’s history of recounted past and present infidelities places her outside her marital 
history with Bloom, with its failures—the death of Rudy, the boredom and suffocation of the housewife 
whose dreams of becoming a prima donna have been stifled and rendered slightly absurd—in an open 
space in which she is able to recreate herself. This is another way of saying that Molly’s utopian “yes” 
at the end of the novel can only come as a consequence of her period of exile from her commitment to 
Bloom, when anything, including infidelity, was possible.  And yet, as Wegner points out regarding 
Groundhog Day, the event occurs only in retrospect, “only after an uncontrollable number of 
repetitions” (32).   
Molly’s virtue is that of actively exiling herself from her present reality with Bloom and 
manufacturing other possibilities, albeit adulterous, with Boylan, which will only reinforce the fact 
that Bloom’s weakness is more potent than Boylan’s strength. In this sense, Molly’s reaffirmed 
commitment to Bloom at the end of the novel meets the utopian requirement suggested in Adorno’s 





words, according to which, in the messianic time, “duty [will have] the lightness of holiday play” (112).  
Molly’s infidelity and later claim to renewed fidelity is not so much a going astray as a way of 
reinventing herself and her marriage. Molly’s exile from history into the fantasy of the erotic is the 
loop through which she returns to her confession of fidelity to Bloom. It contains its own mark of the 
utopian in the fact that she was always already returning to Bloom. 
The difficulty with Molly’s monologue is the same as with issues surrounding Badiou’s naming 
the event. Naming the event constitutes the event for the situation. By being named, the event attains 
a certain efficacy and presence, as the name becomes the trace of the event in the situation, since the 
event is not and cannot be presented as such. Ed Pluth claims that, according to Badiou, the name of 
the event is generated neither by the situation, nor from outside of it, but rather it comes from the 
void itself. A completely new word or name emerges from the void. Naming the event is akin to an 
intervention that splits the event in two: on one hand, we have the actual event, which cannot stand 
presentation and becomes subtracted, and then the naming of the event, which ends up doubling the 
event through a repetition within the situation, bringing about its presentation. Through Cavell’s 
notion of remarriage comedy, Molly’s monologue is such a faithful naming of the event that attempts 
visibility and presentation.  
To sum up Cavell’s argument on remarriage, his emphasis is on the heroine as a married 
woman in a new type of comedy that is not about bringing the pair together, but bringing them back 
together in the wake of conflict, separation or the threat of divorce. He also focuses on a comedic 
genre associated with the thirties and the Great Depression and which calls for the creation of a new 
woman—“a phase in the history of the consciousness of women” (Pursuits16). He defines the means of 
the development of this consciousness as a struggle between two disjunctive positions, between a man 
and a woman who fight for reciprocal recognition. Equality in the relationship happens through a 
series of mishaps that lead from one misunderstanding, disappointment and desire for revenge to 
another—a series of events that ends up with the two hitting a wall. This is the realisation of their need 
for reciprocal forgiveness and personal change, which involves the relinquishing of personal control, 
as Fischer notes (88). The event emerges through divorce. In the threat of separation, the couple’s 
willingness to remain together becomes the free-willed decision that authenticates the marriage. In 
their search for each other, the two have to engage in a series of avoidances and recognitions that 
culminate in the moment of crisis. As Cavell remarks in his discussion of Adam’s Rib, the necessity of 
testing the marriage, of taking it to court, as it were, in the open, in order to preserve mutual 
independence, brings with it “the capacity to notice one another, to remember beginning, to 
remember that you are strangers; but it is only worth subjecting to this examination if the case is one 
of intimacy, which you might describe as the threat of mutual independence” (Pursuits 216). 
In order to preserve the mutual independence, it is precisely because Bloom has fashioned 
young Molly’s subjectivity into one of his liking that he has to release her, and she would have to 
return to him of her own volition rather than merely because he claims her back. In the case of His 
Girl Friday, Cavell claims that Walter needs to give Hildy the freedom to “free herself from her 





divorce, to prompt her to divorce herself from it” (Pursuits 164). Bloom goes even beyond that: he 
helps Molly to enact her freedom by providing opportunities for her tryst with Boylan. In effect, by 
enacting her scene of engagement on the mountain and giving Bloom all the sexual pleasure he 
wanted of her own accord and initiative, Molly brings into contrast her present affair with Boylan as 
counterfeit, less than voluntary, through a different kind of constriction, as if she were asking Bloom 
to save her from the phony happiness Boylan would offer her. This present realisation comes only 
through the repetition of her past realisation of happiness.  
In this context, Molly’s love with Bloom finds its Edenic moment in Gibraltar, followed by a 
prolonged crisis—their marriage. In Lady Eve, Cavell talks about the film as a comic version of the 
expulsion from the Garden of Eden. In a sense, Molly’s story of her childhood and adolescence in 
Gibraltar is exactly that. She too leaves an exotic peninsula on which she had been devoted to the 
pursuit of sexual knowledge, but, more significantly, Bloom himself comes to this island to pursue 
sexual knowledge. Molly herself appears as a native seducer, an inhabitant of this paradise who clunks 
Bloom on the head with the apple of her sexuality. Cavell notes that the myth of the Garden of Eden is 
“about the creation of woman and about the temptability of man,” and the end of Molly’s monologue 
marks this episode as the event: her sexual identification as an exotic flower (Pursuits 48). The fact 
that Bloom tells her she has the body of a flower is consistent with her sexual stories, which involve 
the female body opening to sexual encounters. Bloom’s seduction of Molly, or rather Molly’s of Bloom, 
is described in detail at the end of the section. Cavell also describes the female protagonist of 
remarriage comedies as an adventuress—precisely what Molly is throughout her section—while the 
man is described as a gullible dupe. Though Bloom does not seem to merit this description fully, he 
seems ignorant about Molly’s true thoughts and feelings up on the mountain and throughout her 
monologue. He is a pseudo-scientist, just like Charles in Lady Eve. As Cavell argues, “tales of romance 
are inherently feats of cony catching, of conning, making gulls or suckers of their audience” (Pursuits 
48). Similarly, Molly’s monologue is a debunking of romance. Thus, I equate her monologue with a 
picture of the marriage in crisis, but also with the void opening in a moment of crisis to make room for 
the event-like repetition, culminating in Molly’s affirmative “yes.” As a homecoming—a return to 
Gibraltar, home to her true marriage to Bloom—Molly’s monologue is not a nostalgic return to the 
past, but rather a remaking of the past into the present. It takes into account the crisis of her marriage 
and all the changes she and Bloom have undergone in these almost twenty years.  
If we look at the encounter in Gibraltar as a pivotal moment followed by crisis, we perceive 
this crisis as a period of flight and pursuit, successively. The woman has the knowledge that she is the 
object of the man’s repressed desire. The couple’s attempt to flight, to extricating their lives from one 
another’s, is transforming itself into a process of pursuit, as Cavell notes of the two characters in 
Bringing Up Baby (113).  The midsummer’s eve in Connecticut is an allegory of the wedding 
ceremony, plus the need to hide the embarrassment of the sexual act under laughter, given that both 
characters emerge into adulthood from sexless childhoods. The fact is, however, that as much as the 
woman pursues, the man repeatedly tries to extricate himself, in a metaphorical divorce from her. 
Quite the opposite is true of Molly and Bloom. Though Bloom is the one in pursuit, theoretically, his 





desire for his wife is rather passive. On the other hand, one could argue that Molly’s affair is her own 
version of the pursuit. She has played this teasing game before, with both Bloom and Boylan.  
Infidelity and recommitment are processes by which the characters revalidate their marriage, 
through repetition. Thus, this cycle “poses a question concerning the validation of marriage, the 
reality of its bonding” (Cavell, Pursuits 126). It also addresses the fact that “the validity of marriage 
takes a willingness for repetition, the willingness for remarriage” (Cavell, Pursuits 127). And, most 
importantly, as it applies to Molly and Bloom, “The task of the conclusion is to get the pair back into a 
particular moment of their past lives together. No new vow is required, merely the picking up of an 
action which has been, as it were, interrupted; not starting over, but starting again, finding and 
picking up the thread” (Cavell, Pursuits 127). Only those who are already married can genuinely 
marry, Cavell argues, because they realise that divorce, although theoretically possible, is not feasible 
when “you find that your lives simply will not disentangle” (Pursuits127).   
To claim, however, that in the end Molly’s narrative of infidelity is merely a reassertion of her 
initial fidelity to Bloom is to transform Ulysses into the fairytale it was not meant to be. This narrative 
would bring closure to a space that opens up precisely in order to avoid this totalising reading. The 
repetition of Molly’s final “yes,” if read as a mere re-doubling of her initial acceptance of Bloom’s offer 
of marriage, severs, in fact, rather than puts forth, the utopian values of this repetition. It is this space 
of tautological repetition of the two yeses, that is neither fully the presence of death, nor of life, that I 
seek to define in the rest of this essay.  
A dimension of the Real of this repetition must be brought to light, and what I have in mind is 
the Real at the heart of Lacan’s “zone between-two-deaths” (320). Lacan takes Sophocles’s Antigone 
as his exemplary figure of the Real. Sealed in her tomb, Antigone crosses the threshold between life 
and death: “Although she is not yet dead, she is eliminated from the world of the living” (280). As 
such, she becomes inscribed in the tradition of a varied community of the undead (ghosts, demons, 
vampires, zombies), who are dead in the realm of the Real (as physical bodies) but continue as living 
beings in the realm of the Symbolic. “A-mortal,”the undead is the opposite of that which exists, but 
also of that which is dead. Lacking representation, it belongs to a Real that does not appear as part of 
reality as such. It remains unnamable, incalculable, and uncountable. Felix Ensslin explains that the 
place between two deaths is annihilated in the Symbolic order, in which the fragmentation of the 
mirror stage, with its horror of dissipation, lack of mastery, anxiety, and undifferentiation, is brought 
to closure through the fantasy of unity, of “forming the fragmented body and its drives into a unity” 
that leads to “the possibility of self-control and mastery” (3).  In the place where the Symbolic meets 
the Real, a split opens—the space between two deaths. In fact, Molly’s fidelity is a fiction, but, most 
importantly, so is her infidelity, insofar as it enacts a Romantic idea of the artistic wife. In terms of 
morality, or even aesthetics, the paradigms of marital fidelity or infidelity in modernism, of virtue and 
excellence in general, have lost all applicability. They are merely historical, Romantic topoi, stemming 
from the need in one respect to project and create one’s self, and, in the other, to cast a nostalgic look 
back to a Romantic ideal. Joyce suspends Molly in a void in which the ties with nature are broken. 





This is the space between two deaths, the space where subjectivity as such is produced and is 
productive. In this space, through Molly, Joyce produces valuations of the subject’s non-existence. But 
this space precisely opens up the possibility, not to recover that loss, the self, but rather to empty out 
completely the space of subjectivity.  
Since the space between two deaths is a transitory space, but also a space with no exit, 
subjectivity itself plays out an unending fantasy of either nostalgic restitution or utopian repetition. 
The empty place of subjectivity cannot remain trapped between the two deaths, a place of the undead, 
after all, where nobody lives. Rather, subjectivity acknowledges this gap as the space of possibility. 
Out of it, one either becomes a hysterical melancholic subject in the tradition of Judith Butler, 
attempting the nostalgic restitution of the self under the guise of ideologies of the Symbolic, thus 
betraying the space of suspension and its eventual possibilities. Or, one sees the utopian dimension of 
repetition that lies beyond restitution and that moves beyond the merely ironic and parodic forms of 
restitution, into what Ensslin calls the “Other jouissance” (10). The movement from restitution to 
repetition that marks the space between two deaths and opens the utopian space.  
Regarding the space of suspension between the two deaths, in which the subjectivity is caught 
in the position of the end, James Mellard notes that “the integration of the subject’s position into the 
field of the big Other . . .  becomes possible only when the subject is in a sense already dead  . . . ‘when 
the game is already over’” (194). This is the reason for which Molly’s marriage to Bloom has to go 
through the valley of the shadow of death, in terms of her marital infidelity. Indeed, Molly is living in 
an in-between state, and not only because she is caught between Bloom and Boylan. As a fictional 
character, she is flesh and ideal, satire and romance, archetype and individual, Madonna and whore. 
Another trait of Molly’s suspension is her verbal hysteria, which is a symptom of her entrapment 
between the Symbolic and the Real, once she has committed the adultery out in the open. After all, the 
second death is that of the individual separated from all her previous symbolic systems of survival, 
which in Molly’s case are all connected to Bloom and her marriage to him. She uses her affair with 
Boylan both to expose the fragility of this dependency and to strengthen it. One could borrow Lacan’s 
word extimitié to describe this phenomenon in Molly: her affair is her attempt to draw a line between 
interior and exterior, psychological and real, and to minimise her anxiety.  
Actually, Cavell himself links the comedy of remarriage to Lacan’s concept of the space 
between two deaths, in an interview with Rex Butler, who asks specifically about Lacan’s two deaths in 
connection to the female protagonists under Cavell’s analysis.  Butler notes that some of these female 
characters have refused to compromise their desire, which has driven them to a place beyond their 
death. Butler wonders whether the “unknowability” of these women, in Cavell’s terms, could be 
explained in terms of their uncompromising desire. In response, Cavell discusses the way his comedy 
of remarriage inherits the tradition of “old comedy,” or melodrama, in which the woman may undergo 
a process akin to death and restoration. Pursuing one’s desire to its ultimate consequences marks a 
kind of symbolic death. Since comedy is the inverse form of melodrama, Cavell places the female 
protagonist of the melodrama in an imaginary dialogue with that of the comedy. Addressing the latter, 





the former laments: “You may call yourselves lucky to have found a man with whom you can overcome 
the humiliation of marriage by marriage itself” (Cavell, Contesting Tears 6). What saves Molly from 
the “death-dealing” realisation of her melodrama counterpart is the fact that she escapes into a 
therapy of conversation and wit—what Cavell calls “the willingness for conversation (for ‘a meet and 
happy conversation’) [as] the basis of marriage” (Cavell, Contesting Tears 5). Unlike melodrama 
protagonists, Molly remakes herself not by death and resurrection through the suffering and struggle 
involved in following her desire to its bitter end, but by remaking her surroundings to match herself as 
a new creation. In comedies of remarriage, the creation of the new woman comes as the effect of the 
woman’s education by the man, and Molly is in fact the product of such an education. This is the 
comedic equivalent of dying. As such, Molly is caught between the two deaths: initially, on the cliffs of 
Gibraltar, she becomes the product of Bloom’s desire, the flower of the mountain, and at the end of 
her monologue, transformed by both Bloom and Boylan, she becomes Bloom’s renewed wife. In the 
old comedy, marriage and conversation are neglected. The female protagonists of this older comedy 
redefine themselves through other routes than marriage. Their death-dealing realisations come from 
the fact that they have to cut their ties to acceptable and conventional society. It is the reverse for 
Molly and remarriage comedies. Molly renews her condition by coming to accept what she had refused 
all along, and her final “yes” is the actualisation of her initial symbolic “yes.”  
As yet another example of the remarriage comedy, Ulysses subverts oppressive patriarchal 
practices, as we see Molly’s desire running the show unchecked, though Bloom gets his girl back in the 
end. This is the utopian deferral—that, according to David R. Shumway, the happy ending functions 
both as utopia and totalisation: “We accept the happy ending in part because of the romance that has 
been constructed as erotic tension seeking to be relieved in orgasm. In this sense, the ending functions 
as a consummation of our desire as well” (15).  
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